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NOTES AND COMMENT
BANKS

AND

PAYEE'S

BANKING-LIABILITY OF BANK PAYING CHECK ON
FORGED INDORSEMENT-FICTITIOUS
PAYEE-NEGLI-

GENCE OF DRAWER-ESTOPPEL.

It is the general rule that the bank on whom a check is drawn
makes payment thereon relying solely on the reputed responsibility
of the transferers, and the other parties to it, and its apparent genuineness.' The drawee, therefore, on whom the check is drawn, must
ascertain the identity of the person named therein as payee, and this
at former's peril. 2 3 On the faith of this rule is the business of this
country conducted.
In a recent New York case 4 the following facts were presented:
One Y stole X's passbooks of A bank and went with them to another
state, from which he mailed the books to A bank along with a letter
asking the withdrawal of approximately $9,000, to be sent to him at
the out-of-town address, forging X's signature to the letter. The A
bank drew a check on B bank for the amount payable to X and mailed
it to Y along with one book which still held a small deposit and a
letter addressed to X on A's stationery. C bank paid the checks on
X's forged indorsement. When B bank received the check, it paid
the same, relying on the genuine indorsements of C, D and E banks,
and charged the amount against A's account. X meanwhile discovered the theft of his books and reported such to the bank. Plaintiff
surety company paid A the sum charged by B and sued on an assignment of the claim of A against B. The Court held that the check
was made payable to an actual payee and not to a fictitious person;
that B was guilty of negligence in paying the check without ascertaining the authenticity of payee's indorsement. A's not identifying X's
signature5 in the letter of Y was not such negligence as to preclude a
recovery.
'Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E. 881 (1885).

'Ibid.; Seaboard National Bank v. Bank of America, 193 N. Y. 26,
85 N. E. 829 (1908); Gutfreund v. East River National Bank, 199 N. Y. 222,
92 N. E. 633 (1910); National Surety Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N. Y. 247, 169 N. E. 372 (1929); Greenwald v. State Bank,
125 Misc. 260, 210 N. Y. Supp. 378 (1925); Los Angeles Investment Co. v.
Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919); Union Tool Co. v.
Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424 (1923); Citizens'
National Bank v. Reynolds, 72 Ind. App. 611, 126 N. E. 234 (1920); Commercial Bank v. Arden and Fraley, 117 Ky. 520, 197 S. W. 951 (1917); National
Bank of Commerce v. Fish, 67 Okla. 102, 169 Pac. 1105 (1917) ; State Guaranty
Bank v. Doerfler, 99 Okla. 258, 226 Pac. 1054 (1924) ; Joseph Milling Co. v.
First Bank, 109 Ore. 1, 216 Pac. 560 (1923).
'Gallo v. Savings Bank, supra note 2.
"American Surety Co. v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N. Y. 181, 186 N. E.
436 (1933).
Crane, I., dissents on the ground that the acts of A in not verifying X's
signature in the letter and the making possible of the impersonation and fraud
by the returning of the bank-book, and the forwarding of the check and
personal letter addressed to X, were such acts of negligence on the part of A
as should estop plaintiff from bringing the action. Morgan v. U. S. Mortgage
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Whether the paper is to be considered as having a fictitious
payee depends on the intention of the drawer and not on the actual
existence or non-existence of a payee of the same name as that in the
instrument. This results in the fact that the intent of the party
making the check payable may make a real person fictitious and a
fictitious person real. 6 By express provisions of the statute 7 and at
common law,8 an instrument is not payable to bearer on the ground
that the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, unless such fact
was known to the person making it so payable.
The English cases are quite in accord with this rule. It has been
held in the English courts that a bill payable to a real person who is
not intended by the drawer to have any interest therein, is payable to
bearer and the acceptor's ignorance of such fact is immaterial. 9 But
if the payee is a real person intended by the drawer to be the payee,
the instrument is not payable to a fictitious person and, hence, not to
bearer, and the drawer is not liable to one claiming under a forged
indorsement of the payee's name, although the payee in reality had
no interest in the instrument.' 0
If a bank discounts a check on a forged indorsement of the
payee's name, such constitutes conversion " and the drawee bank
cannot charge the drawer's account for such amount. 12 It is only
where the drawee can claim protection upon some express representation or upon some principle of estoppel or negligence chargeable
to the drawer, that the former is absolved from liability to the latter
for unauthorized payment of a check or draft.' 3 The negligence of
& Trust Co., 208 N. Y. 218, 101 N. E. 871 (1913); Prudential Insurance Co.
of America v. National Bank of Commerce in N. Y., 227 N. Y. 510, 125 N.
E. 824 (1920).
6 Shipman v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371
(1891); Anderson v. Dundee State Bank, 66 Hun 613, 21 N. Y. Supp.
925 (1893).
NEG. INST. LAW, §28: "The instrument ispayable to bearer:
"* * * 3. When itispayable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing
person, and such fact was known to the person making itso payable."
'Seaboard National Bank v.Bank of America, supra note 2.
'Bank of England v.Vagliano [1891] A. C. 107.
"0North & South Wales Bank v. Macbeth [1908] A. C. 137; Vinden v.
Hughes [19051 1 K. B. 795.
' Szwento juozupo Let Draugystes v. Manhattan Savings Institute, 178
App. Div. 57, 164 N. Y. Supp. 498 (lst Dept. 1917) ; Spalding v. First National
Bank, 210 App. Div. 216, 205 N. Y. Supp. 492 (4th Dept. 1924), aff'd, 239
N. Y. 586, 147 N. E. 206 (1924).
' American Exchange National Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616,
204 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1924); Bennett v. First National Bank of Hollywood,
47 Cal. App. 450, 190 Pac. 831 (1920).
'Supra
note 2; Strang v. Westchester County National Bank, 191 App.
Div. 787, 182 N. Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dept. 1920); McKaughan v. Merchant's
Bank and Trust Co., 182 N. C. 543, 109 S.E. 355 (1921); Figuers v. Fly, 137
Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917).
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the drawer must, moreover, be the direct and proximate cause of
payment of the check on the forged indorsement. 14 and must be such
as to proximately affect the conduct of the drawee in the performance of his duties in order to be admissible as a defense. 15 Payment
of a check bearing a forged indorsement of payee's name is deemed
to be negligence, rendering the bank liable 10 and the doctrine of
estoppel does not apply. 17 By contractual obligation,' 8 due care must
be exercised by the bank in the payment of checks and its negligence

defeats the defense of negligence on the part of drawer.19
In the case of Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawrnut Bank 20
the Court held that the duty of the drawee bank to ascertain the
genuineness of the payee's indorsement is not diminished by the fact
that the payment was made through a clearing house. 2 1 Nor does it
other reliable banks as
matter that the bank relies on the guaranty of
22
to the genuineness of the payee's signature.
In Leather Manufacturers'Bank v. Merchants' Bank 23 the Court
said: "If the bank pays out money to the holder of a check upon
which the name of the depositor, or of a payee or indorsee, is forged,
it is simply no payment as between the bank and the depositor; and
the legal state of the account between them, and the legal liability of
the bank to him, remain just as if the pretended payment had not
been made." 24
The doctrine of estoppel is fundamentally established on error
of one party and fault or fraud upon the other, and a defect which
would be inequitable for the party against whom it is asserted to take
"Welsh v. German American Bank, 73 N. Y. 424 (1878); Shipman v.
Bank of State of New York, supra note 6; Janin v. London and San Francisco
Bank, 92 Cal. 14, 27 Pac. 1100 (1891); German Savings Bank v. Citizens'
National Bank, 101 Iowa 530, 70 N. W. 769 (1897); Shepard and Morse
Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 516, 51 N. E. 9 (1898); Mechanics'
National Bank v. Harter, 63 N. J. L. 578, 44 At. 715 (1899); Armstrong v.
Pomeroy National Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N. E. 866 (1889); National Bank
v. Nolting, 94 Va. 263, 26 S. E. 826 (1897) ; Schoefield v. Earl of Londesborough [18961 A. C. 514; Colonial Bank of Australia v. Marshall [1906]
A. C. 559; Roberts v. Tucker, 16 Q. B. 560 (1851); Macbeth v. North and
South Wales Bank [1908] 1 K. B. 13.
" Shepard and Morse Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, supra note 14.
" Morris v. Baumont National Bank, 37 Tex. Civ. A. 97, 83 S. W. 36
(1904).
" Critten v. Chemical National Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969 (1902).
'3Gallo v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, supra note 2.
'Supra note 17.
"'201 Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 740 (1909).
'Dedham National Bank v. Everett National Bank, 177 Mass. 392, 59 N.
E. 62 (1901) ; Murphy v. Metropolitan National Bank, 191 Mass. 159, 77 N. E.
693 (1906).
"Supra note 4.
128 U. S. 26, 34, 9 Sup. Ct. 3 (1888).
21 Washington First National Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 (1876).
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advantage. 25

Fault would arise from a breach of duty or an act of

26
negligence proximately resulting in loss.
In American Surety Co. v. Empire Trust Co.27 the Court held

that the question of whether plaintiff's assignee was estopped by
reason of negligence was for the jury. On appeal, however, the
Court of Appeals, speaking through Lehman, J., says : 28 "The drawee
owed the drawer the duty of paying the draft only to the payee
named. The drawer owed to the drawee the duty only that it would
not by act or misrepresentation facilitate a fraud upon it. Alleged
negligence in delivering a draft or check to a person not authorized
by the payee to receive it is 'immaterial'29 where a party discounts
or pays a draft without sufficient identification of the payee and
upon a forged indorsement. * * * Negligent failure by the drawer to
protect itself against fraud in procuring the making of the drafts
does not cast upon the drawer the risk that they will be paid upon a
forged indorsement."
It is held, therefore, that, as a matter of law, it is immaterial
that the drawer was negligent in not discovering the forgery since
there was no such duty on the drawer to ascertain such fact. The
drawee's reliance on the subsequent bona fide indorsements does not
relieve it from its liability since it is negligence on its part to rely
thereon, and the drawer is not precluded from recovering.
VINCENT
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UNFAIR COMPETITION.

The law governing unfair competition, although still in its
infancy, is rapidly approaching the point where definite judicial reaction may be satisfactorily noted as curbing unfair procedure in
trade.
Fundamentally, the controversy involved trade-names.' The
once well settled rule that an injunction would not be granted unless there was actual competition in the sale of similar merchandise
Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 716 (1877).
-' Sup' a note 13.
- 228 App. Div. 572, 240 N. Y. Supp. 164 (4th Dept. 1930).
'Supra note 4, at 106, 186 N. E. at 437, 438.
Italics author's.
1 Trade-name denotes "all symbols in reference to which a reputation may
be established (e.g., trade-names, including geographical, corporate and personal names; devices such as collocations of colors, peculiar sizes and shapes;
distinctive methods of advertising and marketing generally) which, not being
subject to exclusive appropriation, are protected under the law of unfair competition as contrasted with technical trade-marks, registerable for exclusive use
under modern statutes, and protectable under the common law of trade-marks."
(1930) 30 COL. L. Rzv.. 695.

